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We estimate the effects of public wage expenditures on output and the labor market in U.S. data 
by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages using sign restrictions. Public wage 
shocks do not induce significant effects on output, but disaggregating by government level reveals 
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consumption and increasing labor force participation and private-sector employment. Local 
government wage shocks lead to a similar crowd in of private consumption, while shocks to 
federal government wages lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor 
demand effect, a sharp fall in private-sector employment and an increase in unemployment. We 
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1 Introduction
The last nancial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession still take their toll on many ad-
vanced economies. They have posed a serious threat on output and the labor markets, leading
to an unusually slow recovery. This fact has revived the debate on the e¤ectiveness of discre-
tionary scal policy as a tool to stimulate private activity, establish sustainable growth and
recover lost jobs. Another relevant question that naturally arises in this context is which scal
instruments are the most e¤ective for fueling economic activity.
Most of the empirical VAR literature on the macroeconomics of scal policy does not distin-
guish between di¤erent types of government spending, and treats total government spending as
a single scal instrument. Needless to say, not all types of government spending are expected
to induce the same e¤ects on the macroeconomy. Furthermore, most of the literature interprets
the empirical e¤ects of this total government spending instrument as if they were the result of
changes in government consumption of goods and services. However, government spending is
not only consumption of goods and services. Wage and salary payments account for a large
share of public expenditure in the U.S. During the postwar period, government wage and salary
expenditure has accounted for about 50% of government expenditure (See Figure 1(b)). In the
aftermath of the Great Recession, concern about the government budget has focused greater
attention on the costs that the government incurs to compensate its employees.
Given the weight of wage expenditures in total government spending, the purpose of this
paper is to estimate the e¤ects of public wage bill policies on output and the labor market of the
private sector, and draw policy implications that could be useful in the aftermath of the crisis.
Using U.S. data over the period 1955-2007, we identify exogenous shocks to public employment
and public wages. Following Mountford and Uhlig (2009), we adopt an agnostic identication
that sets a minimum set of sign restrictions to the scal shocks identied. In particular, we
identify shocks to government employment that simultaneously raise government spending and
employment, and similarly shocks to government wages that simultaneously increase govern-
ment spending and government wages per employee. We also ensure that the identied shocks
to the government wage bill are orthogonal to shocks in other spending components and to
shocks to the business cycle, monetary policy and taxes.
In a spirit similar to Ramey (2012), we ask whether the two shocks di¤er in their ability
to stimulate private activity raising employment and lowering unemployment. Our ndings
indicate that for public wage shocks the e¤ects are not statistically signicant at the aggregate
level. Yet, a disaggregation by government level reveals that e¤ects can be contractionary at
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the federal level and expansionary at the state and local level. On the other hand, public
employment shocks are robustly expansionary at all government levels by crowding in private
consumption and increasing labor force and private-sector employment. Shocks to state and
local government wages lead to a similar crowd in of private consumption, while shocks to
federal government wages lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor
demand e¤ect, a sharp fall in private-sector employment and an increase in unemployment.
The existing literature is silent about the e¤ects of shocks to the government wage bill on
private economic activity. Apart from Linnemann (2009) that has demonstrated in aggregate
U.S. time series that increases in government employment generate positive responses of private
employment and real output and a short-lived expansion in private consumption, and Pappa
(2009) that has reported mixed results for the employment response to government employment
shocks using annual U.S. state and aggregate data over the period 1969-2001, very few papers
study the e¤ects of changes in the government wage bill. Moreover, we expand the existing
literature by (i) disentangling the e¤ects of shocks to both public employment and public wages;
(ii) disaggregating the e¤ects by government level; (iii) examining the e¤ects on the labor force
participation and unemployment rates.
In order to explain the empirical ndings, we develop a Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) model with sticky prices augmented with public good production, allowing
for both productive and utility-enhancing services for the public good, search and matching
frictions, and endogenous labor force participation Our theoretical model matches qualita-
tively the empirical evidence for both shocks. More specically, public employment shocks are
expansionary by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor force participation and
employment in the private sector. In the standard neoclassical growth model, increases in pub-
lic employment should reduce private consumption and private employment as the additional
labor supply spurred by the scal shocks negative income e¤ect is entirely absorbed by the
public sector (see Finn (1998)). We show that the complementarity of the public good with
private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household can overturn the
negative wealth e¤ect of the shock and lead to an increase in private consumption. Conrming
in a di¤erent framework the results of Linnemann (2009) who shows that if public services are
complementary to private consumption goods in the households utility function, an increase
in public employment raises private consumption and private sector employment.1 Also in a
1This mechanism when combined with mild increasing returns and variable capacity utilization is shown
to also explain initially positive (though later on negative) responses of investment and real wages to public
employment shocks that seem to be consistent with Linnemanns (2009) empirical evidence.
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similar framework to ours, Forni et al. (2009) demonstrate that shocks to public employment
can lead to increases in private consumption in a model with rule of thumb consumers.2 There
also results a positive covariation between public and private employment, since the additional
consumption demand makes private sector rms, which are demand constrained, expand their
labor input to meet the increase in aggregate demand. Here, we study the e¤ects of both public
employment and public wage shocks and provide an alternative mechanism which rests on the
complementarity channel rather than liquidity constrained households and is able to explain
the transmission of both types of shocks.
Our model can also explain how government wage shocks can be contractionary or expan-
sionary, as found in the data, depending on the relative magnitude of the forces at play. More
specically, wage shocks lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor de-
mand e¤ect, a sharp fall in private employment, and an increase in unemployment. At the
same time, they can lead to a crowd in of private consumption given the complementarity of
the latter with the public good in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household. These
two opposite channels can help explain the empirical results. For su¢ ciently high degree of
complementarity between the public good and private consumption in the aggregate consump-
tion bundle, our model predicts positive e¤ects of government wage shocks on private activity,
as found for state and local government wages in the data. On the other hand, when the com-
plementarity channel is weaker, the wage spillover e¤ect in the private sector dominates, leading
to a substantial fall in private employment and a short-run contraction in private activity.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the public good provided at the federal level may ex-
hibit a di¤erent degree of complementarity with private consumption than that at state and
local level. This might be justied by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each
case. For instance, federal government employees largely comprise military and defense em-
ployees, while state and local government employees provide mainly education, health care and
transportation services. Research by Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) using European data has in-
deed shown that the degree of complementarity between government and private consumptions
is not homogeneous over types of public expenditures. In particular, "merit goods", includ-
ing health and education, complement private consumption while "public goods", referring to
2The response of private consumption following total government spending shocks has received much at-
tention in the literature. Deep habits or rule-of-thumb consumers have been shown to generate consumption
crowding in (e.g., Ravn et al., 2006 and Gali et al., 2007), whereas another class of models includes government
investment as part of the production function (Leeper et al., 2010, Drautzburg and Uhlig, 2015). Monacelli et
al. (2010) show that a combination of consumption-leisure complementarity in households preferences and New
Keynesian features can generate consumption crowding in a model with search and matching frictions.
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defense, public order and justice, are substitutes with private consumption. This idea is in
line with recent work by Perotti (2014) who shows that defense spending shocks in a SVAR
generate "contractionary" responses, while civilian government spending shocks generate large
"expansionary" responses. The theoretical explanation provided in that paper is based on the
assumption that civilian spending exhibits Edgeworth complementarity with private consump-
tion, while defense spending is not utility enhancing. In a similar vein, Pieroni and Lorusso
(2015) present VAR estimates for the U.S. economy showing that civilian expenditure induces
a positive response on private consumption, whereas military spending has a negative impact.
Our results square well also with the evidence presented in Bouakez and Rebei (2007) who, us-
ing a maximum-likelihood estimation with U.S. data, nd a strong Edgeworth complementarity
between the two types of consumption goods. Also, Fève et al. (2013) show that government
spending multipliers obtained in the literature may be downward biased because the standard
approach does not allow for complementarities between private consumption and government
spending in the utility function.
Our work has a number of useful policy implications in the aftermath of the crisis and
the slow recovery in advanced countries. In particular, increases in public employment can
stimulate the private sectors employment, encourage labor force participation and private
demand. On the other hand, public wage policies could be expansionary only if the increases
in wages are associated with the production of those public goods that strongly complement
private consumption. Wage increases should target, for instance, employees that work in public
education or the public health system.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data on the U.S.
government wage bill and public employment, the estimated VAR model and empirical ndings.
Section 3 presents our theoretical model which matches qualitatively the empirical evidence.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical analysis
2.1 Data
As shown in Figure 1(a), since the 1970s public wage expenditures have accounted for around
50% on average of government expenditures in the U.S. and around 5% of GDP. Although the
literature has looked extensively at the macroeconomic e¤ects of certain components of U.S.
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government spending, such as public investment, research on the e¤ects of the public wage
bill has been surprisingly limited, despite the fact that it represents the largest component of
spending, as shown in Figure 1(b). Looking at a decomposition of public wage expenditures by
government level, we see a shift over time towards states and localities, with the federal share
amounting to between 20% and 30% from the 2000s (Figure 1(c)). In 1980, federal civilian
employees made up 2.3% of the workforce, while they accounted for 1.7% of the workforce in
2010 ((Falk (2012)). For the past 30 years, the number of civilians employed by the federal
government has uctuated around 2 million people (see Figure 2). Besides federal civilian
workers, the armed services include steadily more than 2 million uniformed personnel.
In order to take a view of the variation in the government wage bill, in Figure 3 we plot the
quarterly growth changes in the two basic components of the wage bill: government employment
and the average real wage per employee.3 As can be readily seen, the various scal episodes (i.e.
unusually large changes in the spending components) are not correlated: public employment
at the total government level peaks in 1961Q4, 1966Q1, 1980Q2, 1990Q1 and 2000Q2, while
the average wage rate peaks in 1955Q2, 1958Q2, 1969Q1, 1983Q4, 1992Q3 and 2003Q1. Those
scal episodes can be related to several policy episodes in history. In particular, the data point
to a signicant increase in public employment in 1966 when the National Historic Preservation
Act led to major changes in the federal and state employment in historic preservation elds;
in 1977 after Carters appointment and job creation stimulus; in 1990 when President Bush
increased government employment for defense in the face of the German reunication; and
to a fall in public employment in 1980, after Reagan won the presidential election and cut
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1974. Signicant changes in government
wages are observed in 1964, after the Civil Rights Act was passed, making the discrimination
of employees based on race illegal; when the minimum wage increased to $1.30 per hour in
February 1969 and with the Minimum Wage Act of 1983.
2.2 The VAR model
In this subsection, we formalize the econometric framework in order to estimate the short-run
e¤ects of public employment and wage shocks on private activity. We consider a VAR model
3Government employment is dened as the number of government employees per capita, including both
civilian and military employees. Data on the former comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, while the
latter is constructed by Ramey (2011). The average real wage per employee is dened as the compensation of
government employees divided by government employment and the GDP deator.
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of eleven endogenous variables. We rst include the four main items of government spending:
the log of real per capita government expenditure in goods purchases, dened as government
consumption minus compensation of government employees, the log of real per capita gross
xed investment, the log of average real public wage per employee, and the log of government
employment per capita. The second set of seven variables included in the VAR are: the log of
real per capita net (of transfers) tax revenue, the log of real per capita private GDP, private
consumption and private investment, the ination rate, a measure of short-term interest rate
and a labor market variable. The latter alternates between (i) the log of private employment
per capita, (ii) the unemployment rate, (iii) the labor force participation rate, and (iv) the real
private wage rate. Finally, in the VAR we include a constant, a linear trend and an exogenous
war dummy variable with several lags to control for strong anticipation e¤ects (see Ramey
(2011)).
The type and number of variables included in the VAR is mainly dictated by the identica-
tion scheme we use in order to identify government employment and wage shocks, as described
in the next subsection. The fact that we seek for the e¤ects of scal shocks on the private econ-
omy is another reason that orientated us towards considering private sectors measures of most
variables. The output variable, for instance, refers to the value added produced by the private
sector, which equals total GDP net of the government wage bill (according to the denition of
"Private Sector Production" in Ramey (2012), Figure 1). The exclusion of the government wage
bill also allows us to isolate the second-round e¤ects of public wage expenditures on output,
net of the direct impact of the public wage bill on GDP.
According to information criteria, we set the lag length of the VAR to two. We carry out a
Bayesian estimation using at priors on the coe¢ cients of the model and the covariance matrix
of the shocks (see Uhlig (2005)).
We use quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for the U.S. from 1955 to 2007, excluding tur-
bulent periods of extraordinary scal episodes or other special economic conditions (pre-1955
war periods, post-2007 crisis). We estimate the e¤ects of spending policies by government
level: federal government, state and local (S&L henceforth) governments, and total government
(sum of federal and S&L). Hence, the VAR exercise is repeated three times, using government
expenditure series for each government level. The series come from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other sources. A detailed description is provided
in Appendix A.
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2.3 Identifying the shocks
We base the identication of the scal shocks on the sign restriction approach (Uhlig (2005),
Canova and Pappa (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Pappa (2009)). The use of sign restric-
tions avoids, in principle, typical problems associated with the identication of economically
meaningful scal shocks. In particular, problems concerning the endogeneity of scal vari-
ables and the scarceness of reasonable zero-identifying restrictions are to a large extent avoided.
Since our goal is to estimate the e¤ects of scal shocks on output, we cannot restrict output
responses. We opt for an agnostic identication that sets a minimum set of sign restrictions on
the responses to the scal shocks (Mountford and Uhlig (2009)).
More specically, we identify idiosyncratic shocks to four government spending items (public
employment, average public wage per employee, non-wage consumption and investment) that
induce a positive comovement of the respective spending item and total government expenditure
(calculated as the sum of the di¤erent spending components) for half a year.4 We also require
the four spending shocks to be orthogonal among them. Given the assumption on orthogo-
nality between the di¤erent scal shocks, government wage and employment shocks are easily
distinguishable. To control for the business cycle, monetary policy and tax policies, the scal
shocks are also orthogonal to a business cycle, a monetary policy and a tax shock, identied as
in Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The sign restrictions used are summarized in Table 1.
The implementation of the sign restriction approach goes as follows. Let  be the covariance
matrix of the VAR shocks and let PP=  an orthogonal decomposition of . Then, structural
shocks "t are constructed as "t = P 1ut, where ut are reduced form shocks and, for each element
of "t, we check if the required restrictions are satised. If no structural shock produces the
required sign restrictions, the orthogonal decomposition is rotated by an orthonormal matrix
H, with HH= I, such that "t = (PH) 1ut, and the responses to the new set of shocks are
examined. This search process continues, randomly drawing orthonormal matrices H. Since
many Hs can in principle produce the required sign patterns, the error bands we report reect
not only the uncertainty in the reduced form parameter estimates but also how responses vary
with di¤erent Hs.
4Notice that the series of total government spending is not included in the VAR as an extra variable to
avoid multicollinearity problems. We implicitly compute its response by combining the responses of the sum of
government consumption, investment and the wage bill.
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2.4 Results
In Figure 4 we present the responses of output, employment, and the real wage in the pri-
vate sector, as well as the unemployment and labor force participation rates, to the two scal
shocks under investigation and for the various government levels considered. For comparabil-
ity purposes, employment and wage shocks are scaled to represent a 1% of GDP increase in
the government wage bill.5 Each graph presents median estimates (solid line) and pointwise
68% credible bands (dotted lines). According to Figure 4(a), a shock to total (i.e. the sum
of federal and S&L) government employment signicantly stimulates private output and con-
sumption for at least ten quarters. Furthermore, private employment signicantly rises, the
unemployment rate falls and the labor force participation is signicantly encouraged in the
medium run. Notably, public employment shocks are robustly expansionary at any level of
government. Responses for the di¤erent government levels are comparable qualitatively for all
variables apart from the private wage. At the S&L level the private wage increases signicantly
after a government employment shock, while at the federal level its response is negative and
insignicant. Also, quantitatively the e¤ect of government employment shocks is signicantly
more pronounced at the S&L level relative to the federal level.
On the other hand, total government wage shocks have weak and almost no signicant
e¤ects on output, while they induce a fall in private employment, a persistent increase in the
private wage rate and an impact increase in the unemployment rate. Yet, conclusions di¤er
substantially when one looks at the federal and the S&L government components of the wage
bill spending. Shocks to the public wage at the federal level, according to Figure 4(b), induce a
signicant drop in private output, employment and investment and a surge in unemployment,
while shocks to public wage at the S&L government level induce signicant increases in private
output and consumption, a signicant and persistent increase in private wages and a lagged
fall in unemployment (Figure 4(c)).
The di¤erence in the impulse responses translates into di¤erences in the scal multipliers.
Table 2 presents point estimates of the impact output multipliers and the present-value cumu-
lative multipliers up to ve years after the shock. As in Mountford and Uhlig (2009), output
multipliers are computed by dividing the present value cumulative response of output, y; by
the present value cumulative response of total government spending, g; after a shock to each
5As in Perotti (2014), the responses to government employment (wage) shocks are divided by the initial
response of government employment (wage), and further divided by the sample mean ratio of the government
wage bill to GDP. In other words, this scaling refers to an increase in the wage bill induced only by the shocked
wage bill component, as if the other component was kept xed.
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spending component, and nally dividing by the average government spending-to-GDP ratio,
g=y (see the formula below). The discounting is based on the sample mean nominal interest
rate, r:
Present value multiplier at horizon h =
Ph
j=0(1 + r)
 jyjPh
j=0(1 + r)
 jgj
1
g=y
Values for which corresponding 68% condence intervals do not include zero are indicated with
an asterisk.
Looking at the total government spending, shocks to government employment imply the
highest output multipliers at all horizons. A 1% of GDP increase in government spending,
induced by a shock to government employment implies an expansion of private output by
1.16%, 1.46% and 1.43%, one, three and ve years after the shock, respectively. By contrast,
government wage shocks generate insignicant multipliers.
Disaggregating by government level reveals that a 1% of GDP increase in government spend-
ing induced by a shock to federal government employment implies an expansion of private output
by 0.96%, 1.11% and 1.07% one, three and ve years after the shock, respectively. On the con-
trary, a 1% of GDP increase in government spending induced by a shock to federal government
wages implies a contraction in private production by 1.15%, 1.08% and 1.01% one, three and
ve years after the shock, respectively. Finally, at the S&L level, multipliers are positive for
both shocks, but take higher values for employment shocks at all horizons and, as noted ear-
lier, multipliers at the S&L level for government employment and wage shocks are signicantly
higher than at the federal level.
2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Controlling for all government levels
When identifying shocks to the federal or S&L public wage component one may worry that
such shocks are correlated. Increases in the wages of federal employees might correlate with
increases in the wages of public employees at the state and local level, for instance. To check the
sensitivity of our results to the possible correlation of shocks to federal and local government
wage bill spending, we repeat the estimation now controlling for the co-existence of federal and
S&L shocks in the same VAR. In other words, when identifying federal (S&L) government shocks
we further require the shocks to be orthogonal to a generic S&L (federal) government spending
shock. We use the same VAR model enhancing it with an extra variable that stands for either
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the federal or S&L government expenditure. The extra shock to federal (S&L) government
spending is identied by making it orthogonal to all the rest of shocks, and further requiring
federal (S&L) government spending to increase for three quarters.6 Figures 5(a) and 5(b)
show the impulse responses to federal and S&L government spending shocks, while the middle
panel of Table 2 presents the respective output multipliers. As can be easily seen, results remain
unchanged: government employment shocks remain robustly expansionary at any government
level, and have higher e¤ects at the S&L level. S&L government wage increases also expand
output and employment in the private sector, while federal wage increases have contractionary
e¤ects. Multipliers are also comparable.
2.5.2 An alternative identication scheme
Another robustness exercise is related to the identication scheme used to extract the scal
shocks. In particular, we repeat our VAR analysis extracting the scal shocks using a simple
recursive (Cholesky) identication (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). We keep the same ordering
of the variables as in the benchmark VAR. Impulse responses to total, federal and S&L shocks
are presented in Figures 6(a), 6(b) and 6(c), respectively. As in our benchmark specication,
a public employment increase leads to a signicant expansion of private output, consumption
and employment, and a signicant increase in the participation rate. Those e¤ects hold across
any government level and are stronger at the S&L level as before. On the contrary, government
wage shocks induce no signicant e¤ects on output at the aggregate level. When looking at the
di¤erent government levels, we observe that federal wage shocks induce contractionary e¤ects
on output and employment in the private sector, while S&L government wage shocks are clearly
expansionary, thus further conrming our benchmark conclusions. As demonstrated in Table 2
(bottom panel), the ranking and sign of the multipliers are similar to the ones obtained when
we use sign restrictions to recover the shocks.
3 Theoretical analysis
In this section we develop a New Keynesian model with a public sector, search and matching
frictions, and endogenous labor force participation. We assume that a public good produced
6Notice that, according to our benchmark identication scheme, this restriction to federal (S&L) government
spending is common across shocks to government consumption, investment and wage bill. As a result, this
restriction can su¢ ciently identify (and lter out) any government spending shock at the federal (S&L) level.
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in the economy provides both productive services to private sector rms and utility-enhancing
services to the representative household. There are three types of rms in the economy: (i) a
public rm that produces the public good, which is provided for free (ii) private competitive
intermediate rms that use private inputs and the public good to produce a nal good; (iii)
monopolistic competitive retailers that use all intermediate varieties to produce the nal good.
Price rigidities arise at the retail level, while search frictions occur in the intermediate goods
sector. The households members consist of employees, unemployed, and labor force non-
participants. The government collects taxes and uses revenues to nance public expenditures,
the cost of new vacancies in the public sector and the provision of unemployment benets.
3.1 The model
3.1.1 Labor markets
In each period, jobs in each sector j = p; g (i.e. private/public) are destroyed at a constant
fraction j and a measure mj of new matches are formed. The evolution of employment in each
sector is thus given by:
njt = (1  j)njt 1 +mjt (1)
where we assume that matches become productive in the same period. We also assume that
p > g in order to capture the fact that, relatively speaking, the public sector is characterized
by greater job security.7 We consider search as being random and so there is one matching
function that has unemployment, ut; and the total number of vacancies, 
p
t and 
g
t ; as inputs:
mpt +m
g
t = m(
p
t + 
g
t )
ut
1  (2)
where the matching e¢ ciency is given by m. We also assume equal vacancy lling probabilities
in the two sectors:
gt
pt
=
mgt
mpt
(3)
7According to CBO estimates for the period 2005-2010, wages were on average higher for workers in the
federal government than for private-sector workers (Falk (2012)).
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3.1.2 Households
The representative household consists of a continuum of innitely lived agents. The members
of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members that
are out of the labor force, lt, and a consumption bundle, cct, dened as:
cct = [1(ct)
2 + (1  1)(ygt )2 ]
1
2
where ygt denotes a public good, taken as exogenous by the household, and ct is private con-
sumption. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
U(cct; lt) =
cc1 t
1   + 
l1 't
1  '
where  is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,  > 0 is the relative
preference for leisure, and ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The elasticity
of substitution between the private and public goods is given by 
1 2 .
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At any point in time, a fraction njt of the household members are employed in sector j = p; g
(i.e. private/public). Following Ravn (2008), the labor force participation choice is modelled as
a trade-o¤ between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of nding a job. In particular,
the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a job, ut, and the
fraction which are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, lt, so that:
nt + ut + lt = 1 (4)
where nt = n
p
t + n
g
t . The household owns the private capital stock, which evolves over time
according to:
kpt+1 = i
p
t + (1  p)kpt  
!
2

kpt+1
kpt
  1
2
kpt (5)
where ipt is private investment, 
p is a constant depreciation rate and !
2

kpt+1
kpt
  1
2
kpt are
adjustment costs. The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
ct + i
p
t +
Bt+1t+1
Rt
 [rpt    k(rpt   p)]kpt + (1  n)(wptnpt + wgtngt ) +$ut +Bt + pt + Tt (6)
8When this elasticity is greater than one, ct and y
g
t are substitutes, while when it is below one, they are
complements. The Cobb-Douglas specication is obtained when the elasticity is equal to zero.
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where t  pt=pt 1 is the gross ination rate, wjt , j = p; g, is the real wage in each sector, rpt is
the real return on capital, $ denotes unemployment benets, Bt is the real government bond
holdings, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, 
p
t are the prots of the monopolistic retailers,
discussed below, and  k; n; Tt represent taxes on private capital, labor income and lump-sum
transfers, respectively. The households rst order conditions are reported in Appendix B.
3.1.3 Production
Intermediate goods rms Intermediate goods are produced with a Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy:
ypt = (Atn
p
t )
1  (kpt )
 (ygt )
 (7)
where At is aggregate technology, k
p
t and n
p
t are private capital and labor inputs, and y
g
t is the
public good used in production, taken as exogenous by the rms. The public good is provided
for free. The parameter  regulates how the public input a¤ects private production: when  is
zero, the government good is unproductive.
Since current hires give future value to intermediate rms, the optimization problem is
dynamic and hence rms maximize the discounted value of future prots. The number of
workers currently employed, npt , is taken as given and the employment decision concerns the
number of vacancies posted in the current period, pt , so as to employ the desired number of
workers, npt . Firms also decide the amount of the private capital, k
p
t , needed for production.
The problem of an intermediate rm consists of choosing kpt and 
p
t to maximize:
Qp(npt ; k
p
t ) = max
kpt ;
p
t

xty
p
t   wptnpt   rpt kpt   pt + Et

t;t+1Q
p(npt+1; k
p
t+1)
	
(8)
where xt is the relative price of intermediate goods,  is a utility cost associated with posting
a new vacancy, and t;t+1 =
sUct+s
Uct
is a discount factor. The maximization takes place subject
to the private employment transition equation:
npt = (1  p)npt 1 +  fpt pt (9)
The rst-order conditions are:
xt 
ypt
kpt
= rpt (10)
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 fpt
= xt(1   )y
p
t
npt
  wpt + Ett;t+1[(1  p)
{
 fpt+1
] (11)
According to (10) and (11) the value of the marginal product of private capital should equal
the real rental rate and the marginal cost of opening a vacancy should equal the expected
marginal benet. The latter includes the marginal productivity of labor minus the wage plus
the continuation value, knowing that with probability p the match can be destroyed.
The expected value of the marginal job for the intermediate rm, V Fnpt is:
V Fnpt 
@Qp
@npt
= xt(1   )y
p
t
npt
  wpt +
(1  p)
 fpt
(12)
Retailers There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the
unit interval. Retailers buy intermediate goods and di¤erentiate them with a technology that
transforms one unit of intermediate goods into one unit of retail goods, and thus the relative
price of intermediate goods, xt, coincides with the real marginal cost faced by the retailers. Let
yit be the quantity of output sold by retailer i. The nal consumption good can be expressed
as:
yt =
Z 1
0
(yit)
 1
 di
 
 1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The nal good is sold at a
price pt =
hR 1
0
p1 it di
i 1
1 
. The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative price
and on aggregate demand:
yit =

pit
pt
 
yt
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset its price
with a xed probability (1  ). Hence, the price index is given by:
pt =

(1  )(pt )1  + (pt 1)1 
 1
1  (13)
Firms that are able to reset their price choose pit so as to maximize expected prots given by:
Et
1X
s=0
st;t+s(p

it   pxt+s)yit+s
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The resulting expression for pit is:
pit =

  1
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+sp
x
t+syit+s
Et
P1
s=0 
st;t+syit+s
(14)
3.1.4 Wage bargaining
Wages are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining. Workers and rms split
rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on their bargaining power. If we denote
by # 2 (0; 1) the rmsbargaining power, the Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the
weighted sum of log surpluses:
max
wpt

(1  #) lnV Hnpt + # lnV Fnpt
	
where V Hnpt and V
F
npt have been dened above. The optimization problem leads to the following
solution for wpt :
wpt = (1  #)[xt(1   )
ypt
npt
+
(1  p)
 fpt
 hpt ] +
#
(1  n)c;t (l
 '
t   (1  p)n;t) (15)
Hence, the equilibrium wage is the sum of the value of the marginal product of employment
and the value to the rm of the marginal job multiplied by the hiring probability, weighted by
the workers bargaining power, and the outside option of being unemployed, weighted by the
rms bargaining power.
3.1.5 Government
The government sector produces the public good using public capital and labor:
ygt = (Atn
g
t )
1 (kgt )
 (16)
where we assume that TFP is not sector specic and  is the share of public capital. The
government holds the public capital stock. Similar to the case of private capital, the government
capital stock evolves according to:
kgt+1 = i
g
t + (1  g)kgt  
!
2

kgt+1
kgt
  1
2
kgt (17)
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Government expenditure consists of government consumption, modelled as a waste, public
investment, public wage payments, public vacancy costs, unemployment benets, and lump-
sum transfers, while revenues come from the capital and labor income. The government decit
is therefore dened by:
DFt = c
g
t + i
g
t + w
g
tn
g
t + v
g
t +$ut   TRt
where TRt  (wptnpt + wgtngt ) +  k(rpt   p)kpt   Tt denotes tax revenues net of transfers. The
government budget constraint is given by:
Bt +DFt = R
 1
t Bt+1t+1
To ensure determinacy of equilibrium and a non-explosive solution for debt (see e.g. Leeper
(1991)), we assume a debt-targeting rule of the form:
Tt = T exp(ß(ßt  ß)) (18)
where ßis the steady state level of debt to GDP ratio, ßt = Btyt . If 	
g = g; wg denotes the
di¤erent scal instruments, we assume scal rules of the form:
	gt = 	
g  
	gt 1
% g exp(" gt ) (19)
where " 
g
t is a zero-mean, white-noise disturbance, and 
 
g determines the persistence of the
di¤erent processes.
3.1.6 Monetary policy
There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate as a function
of current ination according to the rule:
Rt = R exp(t) (20)
where t measures ination in deviation from the steady state.
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3.1.7 Resource constraint
Private output must equal private and public demand. The resource constraint is given by:
ypt = c
p
t + i
p
t + i
g
t + (
p
t + 
g
t ) (21)
3.2 Calibration
We solve the model by linearizing the equilibrium conditions around a non-stochastic steady
state in which all prices are exible, the price of the private good is normalized to unity, and
ination is zero. We calibrate the model for the U.S. at a quarterly frequency. Table 3 shows
the key parameters and steady-state values targeted in our calibration.
We calibrate the labor force participation and unemployment rate to match the observed
average values. Thus, we set labor force participation, 1-l  n + u, equal to 65% and the
unemployment rate to 6:5%. We x the separation rate in the public sector g = 0:045 and
in the private sector p = 0:05, which is comparable with the estimates for the job separation
rate in Hobijn and Sahin (2009). We set the probability of lling a vacancy  fp = 0:4, and the
matching elasticity with respect to vacancies a = 0:6.
The capital depreciation rates, g and p, are set equal to 0:025. Following the literature, we
set the discount factor  = 0:99, which implies a quarterly real rate of interest of approximately
1%. The elasticity of demand for retail goods, , is set such that the gross steady state markup,

 1 , is equal to 1:25, and the price of the nal good is normalized to one. The TFP parameter,
A, is normalized to one. For the capital share in the private sector production function we
assume a standard value  = 0:36; and in the public sector production function we use  = 0:1.
We set the capital ratio kg=kp = 0:31 using data from Kamps (2006).
We set the replacement rate $
wp
= 0:45, following Brückner and Pappa (2012). The tax
rates are set as follows: n = 30%, and  k = 20%. The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio takes
the value ßt = 60% annually.
We set 1 = 0:95 for the share of private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle
of the household. Regarding the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , much of
the literature cites the econometric estimates of Hansen and Singleton (1983), which place it
"between 0 and 2". In our calibration, we set  = 0:5. Following the literature on Edgeworth
complementarity between private and public consumption goods (see, e.g., Bouakez and Rebei
(2007), Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), Fève et al. (2013)), we set 2 =  1:95, which implies
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elasticity of substitution between the private and public goods given by 
1 2 equal to -0.5. The
inverse of the Frisch elasticity, ', is set equal to 1:5, in the range of Domeij and Floden (2006).
Finally, the models steady state is independent of the degree of price rigidities, the monetary
policy rule, and the size of the capital adjustment costs. Capital adjustment costs are included
to moderate the response of investment with respect to scal shocks. We set the ination
targeting parameter in the Taylor rule  = 1:5, the capital adjustment costs ! = 0:1 and the
price-stickiness parameter  = 0:75.
3.3 Results
In Figure 7 we present impulse response functions to a 1% of steady state output increase in the
public wage bill induced by an increase in public vacancies and in public wages, respectively.
The responses of our benchmark parameterization are denoted by solid lines. All responses are
expressed in percentage deviations from respective steady state values, with the exception of
the unemployment and labor force participation rates that are expressed in absolute percentage
points. We rst report the results of our benchmark calibration for which public wage shocks
have contractionary e¤ects on private sector production in the short run. We then investigate
which are the key elements of the model that can account for the case of positive output e¤ects,
as found for S&L government wage shocks.
The predictions of our theoretical model match well the empirical evidence for public em-
ployment shocks (see Figure 7, top panel). It can be readily seen that this type of shock to the
government wage bill is expansionary for the private sector by crowding in consumption and
increasing labor force participation and employment. In particular, the complementarity of the
public good with private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household
overturns the negative wealth e¤ect of the shock and leads to an increase in private consump-
tion. The unemployment rate initially rises due to the increase in labor market participation
and then falls given the rise in employment. This pattern matches especially well the response
observed in the data for S&L government employment shocks.
Our model can also explain how government wage shocks can be contractionary or ex-
pansionary, as found in the data, depending on the relative magnitude of the forces at play.
More specically, wage shocks lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor
demand e¤ect and a fall in employment in the private sector, as well as an increase in unemploy-
ment. At the same time, there is a boost in the production of the public good as labor supply
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and employment in the public sector increase. Consequently, public wage shocks can lead to a
crowd in of private consumption given the complementarity of the latter with the public good
in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household. These two opposite channels can help
explain the empirical results. As we can see in Figure 7 (bottom panel), with our benchmark
calibration we observe a short run contraction in private-sector production and a rise in the
unemployment rate, which matches the empirical evidence found for federal wage shocks. In
this case the complementarity channel is not su¢ ciently strong to overturn the wage increase
and the negative labor demand e¤ect in the private sector. We next examine whether increasing
the degree of complementarity between the public good and private consumption can generate
an expansion in the private sector, as observed in the data for S&L government wage shocks.
3.4 The complementarity between public and private goods
As already emphasized, the degree of complementarity between the public good and private
consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle of the household is key for determining the
e¤ects of government wage shocks. In this subsection, we investigate how varying this comple-
mentarity a¤ects the transmission of both types of shocks to the public wage bill. The dashed
lines in Figure 7 (top panel) represent responses to a shock in government vacancies when we in-
crease the degree of complementarity between public and private goods (by setting 2 =  3:9).
As we can see, the e¤ects of government vacancy shocks are signicantly more pronounced than
in our benchmark calibration. This is line with the empirical evidence for public employment
shocks exhibiting stronger e¤ects at the S&L level relative to the federal level.9 Turning to the
public wage shocks (see Figure 7, bottom panel), with a higher complementarity between public
and private goods, the increase in private consumption becomes larger, which is in line with the
empirical evidence on the responses of consumption (i.e., signicantly positive for S&L govern-
ment wage shocks and insignicant for federal government wage shocks). Also in line with the
empirical evidence, the fall in investment is somewhat more pronounced now. In turn, the fall
in private employment becomes smaller and so does the rise in the private wage. The increase
in public employment and output leads now to an expansion in private-sector production.
Our theoretical analysis therefore seems to suggest that the public good provided at the
federal level may exhibit a di¤erent degree of complementarity with private consumption. This
9Note that one exception is the response of the real wage, which however is not robust to the alternative
Cholesky identication scheme.
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might be justied by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each case. For in-
stance, federal government employees largely comprise military employees, and even one-third
of the federal civilian workforce are employed in the Department of Defense.10 On the other
hand, S&L government employees provide mainly education, health care and transportation
services.11 Research by Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) with European data has indeed shown
that the degree of complementarity between government and private consumptions is not homo-
geneous over types of public expenditures. In particular, they nd that while some categories
of public spending seem to be substitutable with private consumption, there are also public
expenditure categories which are complements to private spending. More importantly, they
report that the latter case of complementarity seems to be the stronger relation, such that
overall government and private consumption are complements in the aggregate. "Merit goods",
including health and education, complement private consumption while "public goods", refer-
ring to defense, public order and justice, are substitutes with private consumption. Bouakez
and Rebei (2007) further note that examples of public goods that are highly complementary
with private consumption include education and transportation. This idea is in line with recent
work by Perotti (2014) who shows that defense spending shocks in a SVAR generate "contrac-
tionary" responses, while civilian government spending shocks generate large "expansionary"
responses. The theoretical explanation provided in that paper is based on the assumption that
civilian spending exhibits Edgeworth complementarity with private consumption, while defense
spending is a waste. In a similar vein, Pieroni and Lorusso (2015) present VAR estimates for
the U.S. economy showing that government civilian expenditure induces a positive response on
private consumption, whereas military spending has a negative impact.
3.5 The productive role of the public good
Our analysis so far highlights the importance of the public good in the utility function of the
household. One might ask though whether the presence of the public good in the production
function of the private sector could be an alternative channel that can explain the mixed
10Falk (2012) provides detailed information on the occupational tasks of the federal civilian workforce: 57%
of them worked at three departments in 2010: (i) the Department of Defense employs more than one-third;
(ii) the Department of Veterans A¤airs employs 14%; (iii) the Department of Homeland Security employs 8%.
Another 40% of federal civilian employees work for the other departments and agencies of the executive branch,
while the remaining 3% is employed by the legislative and judicial branches of government.
11As reported by McNichol (2012), by far the largest share of S&L government workers in 2010 were the
nearly 7 million teachers and support sta¤ working in the nations schools. Other important categories of S&L
employment are protective services (including police o¢ cers and re ghters), higher education, health care,
and transportation (including road maintenance workers and bus drivers).
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sign of the output response for public wage shocks. In this subsection, we show in Figure
8 that even though increasing the degree of productivity of the public good (by setting  =
0:35) can generate an expansion in private sector production following a government wage
shock, it fails nevertheless to account for the positive response of private employment after a
shock to government vacancies. As can be seen by the dashed lines in Figure 8 (top panel),
private employment falls in this case as the rise in labor market participation is not su¢ ciently
strong to overturn the drop in hirings in the private sector associated with the larger marginal
product of labor and the larger increase in wages. The rise of private employment after a
public employment shock is a robust nding in the data that holds across all government levels
considered. We therefore conclude that the main theoretical channel explaining our empirical
evidence remains the complementarity between private consumption and the public good in the
aggregate consumption bundle of the household.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper estimated the e¤ects of public wage expenditures on output and the labor market
of the private sector in U.S. data by identifying shocks to public employment and public wages.
Public wage shocks do not induce signicant e¤ects on output, but a disaggregation by govern-
ment level reveals that the e¤ects can be contractionary at the federal level and expansionary
at the state and local level. On the other hand, public employment shocks are robustly ex-
pansionary at all government levels by crowding in private consumption and increasing labor
force participation and private-sector employment. Shocks to state and local government wages
lead to a similar crowd in of private consumption, while shocks to federal government wages
lead to public-private wage spillovers, inducing a negative labor demand e¤ect, a sharp fall in
private-sector employment and an increase in unemployment. We developed a DSGE model
with a public good providing both productive and utility-enhancing services, search and match-
ing frictions, and endogenous labor force participation which was able to explain the qualitative
properties of the empirical evidence. Our theoretical framework showed that the sign of the
output response for public wage shocks depends crucially on the degree of complementarity
between the public good and private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle.
Our analysis therefore suggests that the public good provided at the federal level may ex-
hibit a di¤erent degree of complementarity with private consumption than that at state and
local level. This might be justied by the di¤erent nature of the public good provided in each
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case. For instance, federal government employees largely comprise military and defense em-
ployees, while state and local government employees provide mainly education, health care and
transportation services. Our work has a number of useful policy implications in the aftermath
of the crisis and the slow recovery in advanced countries. In particular, increases in public
employment can stimulate the private sectors employment, encourage labor force participation
and private demand. On the other hand, public wage policies could be expansionary only if
the increases in wages are associated with the production of those public goods that strongly
complement private consumption. Wage increases should target, for instance, employees that
work in public education or the public health system.
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APPENDIX
A Data denitions and sources
Government consumption: Consumption expenditures, Item 18, Table 3.1. (Total Govern-
ment) - Item 21, Table 3.2. (Federal Government) - Item 23, Table 3.3. (S&L Govern-
ments) - Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Government wage bill: Compensation of general government employees, Item 4 (Total Gov-
ernment) - Item 15 (Federal Government) - Item 50 (S&L Governments), Table 3.10.5.
Government Consumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output, Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Government non-wage consumption: Government consumption minus Government wage bill
Government investment : Gross government investment, Item 36, Table 3.1. (Total Govern-
ment) - Item 41, Table 3.2. (Federal Government) - Item 39, Table 3.3. (S&L Govern-
ments) - Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Civilian government employment (Total): All Employees: Government, CES9000000001, Source:
US. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Civilian government employment (Federal): All Employees: Government: Federal, CES9091000001,
Source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Government employment (State and Local): Civilian government employment (Total) minus
Civilian government employment (Federal)
Military employment : Source: Rameys (2011) dataset
Government employment (Total): the sum of Civilian government employment (Total) and
Military employment
Government employment (Federal): the sum of Civilian government employment (Federal)
and Military employment
Government wages per employee: the ratio of Government wage bill to Government employ-
ment
Net (of transfers) tax revenue (Total government): Current tax receipts (Item 2) plus Con-
tributions for government social insurance (Item 7) plus Current transfer receipts (Item
13) minus Current transfer payments (Item 19) minus Subsidies (Item 27), Table 3.1.
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
27
Net (of transfers) tax revenue (Federal): Current tax receipts (Item 2) plus Contributions
for government social insurance (Item 11) plus Current transfer receipts (Item 16) minus
Current transfer payments (Item 22) minus Subsidies (Item 32), Table 3.2. Government
Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Net (of transfers) tax revenue (State and Local): Current tax receipts (Item 2) plus Contri-
butions for government social insurance (Item 11) plus Current transfer receipts (Item
16) minus Current transfer payments (Item 24) minus Subsidies (Item 30), Table 3.3.
Government Current Receipts and Expenditures, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Total output : Gross domestic product, Item 1, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, Source:
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private output : Total output minus Government wage bill.
Private consumption: Personal consumption expenditures of non-durables and services, Items
5+6, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private investment : Non-residential investment, Item 9, Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product,
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Private employment : All Employees: Private, CES0500000001, Source: US. Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Private wage rate: Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Compensation Per Hour, Source: US.
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Unemployment rate: Unemployment Rate, LNS14000000, Source: US. Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics.
Labor force participation: Labor Force Participation Rate, LNS11300000, Source: US. Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
Ination rate: the quarterly growth rate of GDP deator
Interest rate: FED Funds Rate, Item: FEDFUNDS, Source: FRED.
GDP deator: Gross Domestic Product, Item 1, Table 1.1.4 Price Indexes for Gross Domestic
Product, Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Population: Series LNU00000000, Source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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B F.O.C. from the households problem
If we denote by ct; npt; ngt; ut the Lagrange multipliers, the rst-order conditions of the
households optimization problem are:
[wrt ct]
cc
(1  2)
t 1(ct)
(2 1) = ct (A1)
[wrt Kpt+1]
ct

1 + !

Kpt+1
Kpt
  1

= Etct+1
(
1  p + [rpt+1    k(rpt+1   p)] +
!
2
"
Kpt+2
Kpt+1
2
  1
#)
(A2)
[wrt Bt+1]
ctt+1 = Etct+1Rt (A3)
[wrt njt+1]
njt = Et

ct+1(1  n)wjt+1 + njt+1(1  j)  Ul;t+1

for j = p; g (A4)
[wrt ut]
npt 
hp
t + ngt 
hg
t + ct$ = Ul;t (A5)
where Ul;t  l 't is the marginal utility from leisure (labor market non-participation). Equa-
tions (A1)-(A3) are standard and include the arbitrage conditions for the returns to private
consumption, private capital and bonds. Equation (A4) relates the expected marginal value
from being employed to the after-tax wage, the utility loss from the reduction in leisure, and the
continuation value, which depends on the separation probability. Equation (A5) states that the
value of being search active (rather than non-participating), ct$, plus the expected marginal
values of being employed, njt, weighted by the job nding probabilities,  
hj
t , should equal the
marginal utility from leisure, Ul;t.
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Tables
Table 1: Identifying restrictions
shocks
Restricted variables "c
g
t "
ig
t "
ng
t "
wg
t "
BC
t "
MP
t "
T
t
Output +
Private consumption +
Private investment +
Ination rate +
Interest rate -
Tax revenue +
Total government expenditure + + + +
Government (non-wage) consumption +
Government investment +
Government employment +
Government wage per employee +
Notes: All restrictions apply to 0-3 periods after the shock.
"cgt : government consumption shock, "
ig
t : government investment shock, "
vg
t : government employment shock
"wgt : government wage shock, "
BC
t : business cycle shock, "
MP
t : monetary policy shock, "
T
t : tax shock
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Table 2: Output Multipliers
Benchmark VAR
Total Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 0.87 0.52 0.72* -0.27 3.13* 3.73
T=1 1.16* 0.16 0.96* -1.15* 3.57* 3.22*
T=2 1.41* 0.31 1.06* -1.17* 4.42* 3.38*
T=3 1.46* 0.40 1.11* -1.08* 4.64* 3.44*
T=4 1.44* 0.42 1.09* -1.03* 4.59* 3.46*
T=5 1.43* 0.42 1.07* -1.01* 4.49* 3.44*
VAR, controlling for all government levels
Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 1.12 -0.42 2.01 3.37*
T=1 1.74* -1.54* 2.81* 2.56*
T=2 1.97* -1.21* 3.74* 2.79*
T=3 2.00* -0.87 3.97* 2.99*
T=4 1.97* -0.69 3.90* 3.05*
T=5 1.96* -0.61 3.81* 3.05*
VAR, Cholesky identication
Total Federal State & Local
Ng Wg Ng Wg Ng Wg
T=0 1.92* 0.19 1.47* -3.81* 5.12* 5.28*
T=1 2.72* -0.66 3.13* -4.97* 5.06* 5.23*
T=2 3.16* -0.70 4.28* -5.16* 6.14* 2.76*
T=3 3.21* -0.29 4.48* -4.35* 5.67* 2.57*
T=4 3.05* 0.06 3.34 -3.73* 4.48* 2.89*
T=5 2.59 0.20 1.26 -3.10* 3.40* 3.02*
Ng: government employment, Wg: government wages
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Table 3: Parameter values
Parameters Description Values Parameters Description Values
 discount factor 0.99  fp priv. vacancy lling probability 0.4
 risk aversion coe¢ cient 0.5 
wp
vacancy cost - wage ratio 0.045
1 private consumption share in cc 0.95
u
1 l unemployment rate 0.065
2 CES elasticity -1.95
ng
n
public employment share 0.16
' inverse of Frisch elasticity 1.5 $
wp
replacement rate 0.45
 productivity of public goods 0.15 w
g
wp
steady-state wage ratio 1.01
 productivity of private capital 0.36  matching elasticity 0.6
 productivity of public capital 0.1 1  l labor participation rate 0.65
Kg
Kp
steady-state capital ratio 0.31 g public separation rate 0.045
j capital depreciation rate 0.025 p private separation rate 0.05
! adjustment costs parameter 0.1 "
" 1 steady-state markup 1.25
n labor tax rate 0.3  price stickiness 0.75
 k capital tax rate 0.2 % g persistence of shocks 0.8
ß debt to GDP ratio 0.6 ß debt coe¢ cient -2
A steady-state TFP 1  Taylors  coe¢ cient 1.5
Notes: j = p; g and  =g; wg
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Figures
(a) Historical evolution
(b) Comparison with the other spending components (as % of total spending)
(c) Disaggregation by government level
Figure 1: The government wage bill in the U.S. (Data source: BEA)
:
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Figure 2: Trends in U.S. government employment, 1980-2010 (Source: Falk (2012))
34
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
(a) Growth rate of total government employment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
(b) Growth rate of total government wage rate
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
(c) Growth rate of federal government employment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
(d) Growth rate of federal government wage rate
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
(e) Growth rate of S&L government employment
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
-0.02
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
(f) Growth rate of S&L government wage rate
Figure 3: The volatility in U.S. government expenditure series
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
controlling for shocks at all government levels
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to government employment and wage shocks,
Cholesky identication
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